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Moral Shock and Legal Education
Susan A. Bandes
The concept of “moral shock” describes the sense of outrage that occurs
when an event or newly acquired information shows that the world is not what
one had expected.1 Moral shock combines the cognitive, moral, and emotional
realms. It includes “a visceral, bodily feeling, on a par with vertigo or nausea.
The prospect of unexpected and sudden changes in one’s surroundings can
arouse feelings of dread and anger.”2 Dread can paralyze. Anger, on the
other hand, can be “transformed into moral indignation and outrage toward
concrete policies and decision makers,”3 and toward a rethinking of one’s
moral principles.
For my criminal procedure students, as for much of the nation, the events
collectively known as “Ferguson,”4 as well as the dashcam and bodycam
and cellphone videos of police encounters with unarmed motorists turning
deadly, have evoked a powerful moral shock. Moral shock can be transient or
transformative. What is my role in transforming the moral shock generated by
Ferguson into something of lasting value?
The day after the Ferguson grand jury declined to indict was a rare kind of
teaching day. We want our students to be open to new information, eager to
gain knowledge, passionate about what they learn. On that day my students
came to class not just open but vulnerable and in pain, not just curious but
needing answers. They were desperate to understand how this sort of injustice
could occur, and what could be done to ﬁx it. They were desperate to be
reassured that law matters. I have occasionally experienced such teaching
days, when it felt as if the students were teetering on the edge of an abyss.
We were far enough into the term to have discussed countless divergences
between the law on the books and the law in the streets, and we had often
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considered the inevitable question: “Why should we study these rules if it is so
easy for the police to get around them or ignore them?” But this felt diﬀerent.
Some days it is diﬃcult to convey the malleability and indeterminacy of
legal rules. Some days it is diﬃcult to convince students that law is more
than just a series of doctrinal rules they can simply memorize. On that day, it
was not diﬃcult to move away from the strictures of doctrine—instead, it was
diﬃcult to convince my students that law matters at all. What my students
felt was outrage and raw pain. I saw my job that day as ﬁnding a way to
acknowledge and honor those feelings without rushing to shape them into
doctrinal critiques.
As The New York Times summarized it, “Raw video has thoroughly shaken
American policing . . . [leading to] nationwide protests, federal investigations
and changes in policy and attitudes on race.”5 The shock that these videos
elicit is not universally shared. As Paul Butler observed, “A lot of white people
are truly shocked by what these videos depict; I know very few AfricanAmericans who are surprised.”6 It is precisely this chasm that makes the videos
such a crucial addition to the national conversation on policing. For many,
these videos are new information. They contradict oﬃcial stories that have
long gone unchallenged. One pernicious characteristic of this type of police
misconduct and brutality—the one that has permitted it to ﬂourish virtually
unchecked—is precisely that so many people of means, power, and inﬂuence
will never experience it7 and, therefore, will dismiss it as improbable, anecdotal,
or even somehow deserved.8
There are powerful barriers to communicating this information. One barrier
is simply that the oﬃcial version was long the only version communicated to
the public, and alternative versions were suppressed, belittled, and dismissed.
Another barrier is that even when accurate information is available, there
is a relentless drive to portray each death as an isolated incident by a lone,
rogue oﬃcial—and moreover as an incident that would have been avoided
if only the decedent had “followed the law.”9 This dynamic has been all too
evident as the circumstances of the deaths of Eric Garner and Tamir Rice and
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Walter Scott and Freddie Gray and Sandra Bland and Samuel Dubose and
so many others have come to light. In each case, even in the face of contrary
evidence, eﬀorts were made to portray these encounters as the products of
rogue cops and blameworthy victims. Such narratives have long been readily
accepted, and not only because the “rotten apple” narrative is self-protective
for police departments and other oﬃcial entities. Their power also derives
from a deeply rooted desire to believe that the world is just10 and that the
police are upstanding,11 and that it is in our control to avoid fates like Bland’s
and DuBose’s as long as we follow the rules.
Barriers aside, much of this information has been available for a long
time, and the power of the Darren Wilson verdict and the videos cannot be
explained entirely as the function of new information. I, like many of my
colleagues who teach criminal procedure, have talked to my students for years
about the problems of pretextual stops, the disparate impact of stop-and-frisk
on minority communities, and many of the other issues raised by police-citizen
encounters. But there has always been the question of how to make these
issues visceral—how to evoke the moral shock they deserve. The videos have
an impact that simply cannot be elicited by words.12
For many years I told my criminal procedure students that their attitudes
toward the doctrines constraining the police power would depend on whether
they believed that the police power would ever be misused against them or
those they care about. This was meant as a call to summon a certain kind
of empathy—the understanding that abuse of police power is not something
that happens only to some “criminal class” that exists far from our realm of
concern. But as I began studying police brutality in the late 1990s, in the
wake of the Abner Louima and Amadou Diallo cases and the Chicago police
torture scandal, I began to understand that empathy based on the likelihood
of shared experience would not be suﬃcient. It is important to convey that
police intrusion cannot be avoided simply by avoiding criminal behavior, and
that “criminal behavior” is a capacious and unstable category that does not
merely encompass violent felonies. But that is not enough. It is also essential
to communicate that, for many students, extrapolating from their own
experience and the experiences of their friends and family members leads to a
very skewed notion of policing—one that ignores what is essentially a separate
system of policing for minority communities.
The looming question, in short, is how to make visceral an experience that
is alien to the lives of many law students. It is not enough to talk about drug
testing, roadblocks, airport searches, run-of-the-mill traﬃc citations, and the
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other sorts of police actions that most frequently intersect with the lives of
privileged, non-minority students. Such examples fail to convey the terror and
intensity of experiencing the sorts of demeaning, escalating, violent traﬃc
stops these videos document. They fail to convey the experience of living in
pervasive fear of being stopped; the urgent need to teach one’s children at
an early age how to behave during a police encounter; the awareness that a
seemingly innocuous encounter can quickly turn deadly.
For years I cited statistics. I showed ﬁlms about Driving While Black. I
encouraged students to tell their own stories. Some of these stories were the
most eﬀective teaching tool I had—students gut-punched with the realization
that unwarranted police brutality could be visited on their own friends,
classmates and colleagues, or members of their classmates’ families.13 And
ﬁnally, we have gained access to the videos—the cellphone videos, the dashcam
and bodycam videos—what Paul Butler calls “the C-SPAN of the streets.”14
Not only do they contradict the oﬃcial story time and time again; they open a
vivid window onto what is, for many, an entirely separate reality.
The fall semester of 2014 began in late August, a few weeks after Darren
Wilson killed Michael Brown. Then in late September, just over the border
from Chicago in Hammond, Indiana, police pulled over a car containing an
African-American family, and ticketed the driver for failure to wear a seat belt.
They then, for no discernible reason and with no legal justiﬁcation, demanded
identiﬁcation from the driver’s husband, Jamal Jones, who was sitting in the
passenger seat. The encounter quickly escalated as the police pulled a gun, the
terriﬁed passenger refused to exit the car, and the oﬃcer broke the window,
tased him, and pulled him out of the car through the window. The couple’s
fourteen-year-old son in the back seat ﬁlmed the encounter on his cellphone as
shattered glass ﬁlled the passenger compartment and he and his seven-year-old
sister screamed in terror. In early October, the couple ﬁled suit, and a video
of the encounter was released. In horror, we watched the video in class. We
discussed the civil suit ﬁled by the family and the pending FBI investigation.
On November 24th, we heard that the FBI investigation had been closed.15
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The following day, the grand jury decision in the Darren Wilson case was
announced. My class met shortly after we learned that no indictment would
issue. Their reactions included confusion, a sense of betrayal, and outrage.
We had a useful discussion about the ways in which prosecutor Robert P.
McCulloch’s approach in Wilson’s case was unusual, how it deviated from the
norm. We discussed his decision to bombard the grand jury with information
while withholding his own guidance on which information was important;
his failure to intervene or weigh in despite the presentation of testimony he
regarded as false; his failure to ask the grand jury to indict. We discussed
and critiqued the rules, we discussed the political pressures, we discussed
the origins and purposes of the grand jury, and we discussed bias—conscious
and unconscious. This was productive. Students are often resistant to the
notion of indeterminacy; they are not always open to the idea that historical
and political and social context shape law. That day these explanations made
sense, and helped address the need to make sense of what had occurred. But as
I conducted this discussion, I thought uneasily about the way lawless actions
and decisions become normalized—about the way it all becomes part of the same
doctrinal conversation. I thought of Elizabeth Mertz’s ethnographic study of
the ﬁrst year of law school, in which she describes an inexorable pressure in
the classroom toward the normalization of narrow, legalistic evaluations of
disputes, and away from the use of moral and social frameworks.16
It goes without saying that we need to help our students learn how to
read closely and articulate and defend their arguments and place doctrine in
larger theoretical, social, and political contexts. But it is less often observed
that we play an important role in modeling and channeling the ways in which
our students express and manage their emotions—emotions that are closely
intertwined with moral intuitions and moral reasoning. Often the default
reaction is to tamp down strong emotions or shift students to a purely cognitive
realm, but there are serious risks to this approach.17
As I write this essay, we are in the midst of trying to piece together how
a young African-American woman named Sandra Bland died in a Texas jail
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three days after being pulled over for failing to signal a lane change.18 It is
summer, and class has not yet begun. I think about how we might dissect this
traﬃc stop in my criminal procedure class. We would talk about the litany of
case law that breaks down a traﬃc stop into so many component parts: the
fact that failure to signal a lane change actually does provide probable cause
for a stop and that there is no constitutional bar to converting a simple traﬃc
stop for failure to signal into a full-blown custodial arrest19; the fact that even
if the oﬃcer is wrong about the legality of the stop, his mistake of law may
be excused if it is “reasonable”20; the fact that, assuming the stop is still in
progress, probable cause also allows the oﬃcer to order the driver (or even the
passenger) to step out of the car, regardless of whether there is any good reason
for such an order.21 We could debate whether the stop was still in progress when
Sandra Bland refused to extinguish her cigarette and then refused to exit the
car.22 We could talk about the Supreme Court’s parsimonious interpretation
of the concerns of the Fourth Amendment. We would certainly observe that
the issue of how the motorist is treated—the lack of respect, the assault on
dignity—is rarely addressed in Fourth Amendment law, and that the issue of
whether the motorist’s race led to the stop or aﬀected the nature of the stop is,
according to the Supreme Court, not a Fourth Amendment issue at all.23 We
have debated and critiqued this case law time and again, and I would have
said that I understood these problems fully. Nevertheless, as I write this in
the immediate wake of the deaths of Samuel Dubose and Sandra Bland, the
doctrinal debate feels like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. At this
point, the Fourth Amendment cases we dissect year after year strike me as little
more than a legal veneer legitimating racially discriminatory police brutality
and violence.
The foundational cases that constitutionalized criminal procedure did not
acknowledge their own origins—they were responses to racial inequality and
injustice but rarely mentioned race explicitly.24 It is possible to teach an entire
course on criminal procedure without acknowledging that we still have, today,
two separate sets of rules governing police-citizen encounters. Although some
aspects of this racial chasm can be conveyed through our usual doctrinal tools,
18.
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one problem confronting criminal procedure teachers is the very scope of the
ﬁeld. Criminal procedure is a constitutional course that focuses mainly on
individual rights and remedies. Its canon has little to say about the law as
an instrument of social control. That is left to criminology and sociology.25
It has little to say about the impact of policing on predominantly minority
communities. Many of the remedial options that address systemic racial bias,
such as Section 1983 suits under the Fourteenth Amendment or federal pattern
and practice suits brought by the Department of Justice, are addressed only
brieﬂy. Although the course focuses largely on the courts, and especially
the Supreme Court, most of the promising solutions to racial disparity and
misconduct in policing lie outside the courtroom.26
One response is to widen the curricular lens. Many of the most eﬀective
exchanges I have had with students about core legal concepts like justice,
fairness and inequality have taken place in seminars and other courses that
eschew casebooks and doctrinal texts. The most powerful have involved
narrative texts, ﬁction or nonﬁction.27 Next spring, I will teach a criminal
procedure seminar that focuses on the policing of minority communities. We
will read, among others, Jill Leovy’s Ghettoside,28 Alice Goﬀman’s On the Run,29
Steve Bogira’s Courtroom 302,30 Claudia Rankine’s Citizen,31 Michelle Alexander’s
The New Jim Crow,32 and Ta-Nehisi Coates’ Between the World and Me,33 as well as
25.
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critiques and commentaries of these texts. Seminars, however, reach only
a small group of students. My next step is to explore incorporating similar
narratives into the core course.
Ta-Nehisi Coates talks about coming to view “the gnawing discomfort, the
chaos, the intellectual vertigo” produced by his education as a “beacon” rather
than an alarm. He says, “It began to strike me that the point of my education
was a kind of discomfort,” that “discord, argument, chaos, perhaps even fear”
were a “kind of power.”34 As I stood before my students on the day we learned
about the Darren Wilson grand jury verdict, I thought not for the ﬁrst time
that the impulse to reassure my students that we can create intellectual order
out of chaos is something I do for myself as much as for them. Inaugurating
my students into a world of doctrinal order, in which some doctrines have to
be tweaked but the framework is sound, in which I am in possession of the
answers, is reassuring for all of us. But our most powerful legal tools come
from seeing things as they are, free of comforting myths.
This terrible moment is a window, an opportunity. If the term “systemic
injustice” sometimes sounds abstract to my students, the “C-SPAN of the
streets” has made it concrete. We are confronted with the limits of doctrine,
and the limits of courts as engines of change, and the ways in which doctrine
shape-shifts around an enduring status quo. The good news is that we can
help our students stare into that abyss and come out stronger. It is not my
job to reassure my students that law makes sense. It is not my job to allay
my students’ anger. Where—as here—it is appropriate, my job is to help them
nurture that anger into an abiding moral outrage, and to help them deploy
their legal education to put that outrage to good use.
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